The "Spirit of 1914" and the Right
The outbreak of the war generated contradictory emotions among those on the right. On the one hand, the war was perceived as a threat to the conservative spirit in Europe, while on the other, it gave birth to outbursts of patriotism, rallyng people around the Monarch. According to S.K. Glinka-Ianchevskii, the editor of the daily Zemshchina that was associated with right-wing politicians in the Duma, the confl ict between Germany and Russia-"these two most powerful monarchies, the cornerstones of the Christian civilization,"-threatened the very existence of both. 11 But at the same time, however, the war facilitated political consolidation. " . . . The Russian people met the enemy well prepared for action, and all internal confl icts and disorders faded away at the moment when the fi rst gust of the war storm blew," wrote an editorial in Moskovskie vedomosti, the eldest provincial conservative newspaper. 12 In the same vein, the title of Kolokol's editorial was "Russia is one family." 13 Apparently, the representatives of the Right were candid in their public utterances, and their private papers contained the same message: "There are no grounds to be afraid for Petersburg, and local inhabitants do not express any fear . . . in general, in Moscow and Petersburg the mood is excellent, the reservists move quietly, the rumors are good,"-remarked the extreme rightist academician A.I. Sobolevskii.
14 Members of right-wing factions in the representative chambers shared his view. "The war with the Germans is very popular, and the populace is ready for any sacrifi ces," wrote State Council rightist group member N.A. Zverev. 15 Those on the right were sure that public unity rested on a conservative basis. S.L. Obleukhova, one of the leaders of the Union of Archangel Michael, stated: "Now, at least while the war lasts, there is no one left to struggle against as in the past, no revolutionaries, no cosmopolitans, no others. All of Russia has become chernosotennoi [Black Hundreds], extreme right wing." 16 Especially important for the rightists was the fact that the Tsar became the symbolic center of patriotic consolidation. A.K. Varzhenevskii, one of the leaders of the Moscow province nobility asked rhetorically: "Could one expect four months ago that a crowd of many thousand students would sing on their knees in front of the Winter Palace?" 17 Paradoxically, the war became a starting point for the improvement of Russia according to those on the right. According to Moskovskie vedomosti: "This war is God's miracle and God's mercy. It is a medicine, which is bitter and terrifying, but necessary to cure our disease. The war has regenerated our society right from the beginning: it has transformed us, made us healthy, strong and resolute."
18 Duma right-wing faction member S.A. Volodimerov hoped that the war would weaken the infl uence of the liberal intelligentsia, 11. S. Glinka, "Dobilis΄ svoego!," Zemshchina, July 19, 1914, 3. 12. "Prezhde vsego-sderzhannost΄ i vyderzhka," Moskovskie vedomosti, July 30, 1914, 1.
13. "Vsia Rossiia-odna sem΄ia," Kolokol, The Right and the Russian Variant of "Sacred Unity"
Although those on the right were satisfi ed with the reaction of Russian society to the outbreak of the war, they held contradictory visions on how to use the rise of patriotism. During the fi rst months of the war, rightists developed two diametrically opposed political strategies. Some of them decided that war and patriotic consolidation might help to curb (ideally-to get rid of) democratic institutions and procedures. On the contrary, their opponents interpreted the rise of patriotic feelings as proof of the effi cacy of the policies of reform and supported the idea of the "Sacred Unity."
A number of members of the 21 Members of the extreme Right were especially irritated by the appeal of the Supreme Commander, the Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, to the Polish people titled "To the Poles!," which promised to reunite Poland aft er victory over Germany and Austria-Hungary and give it wide autonomy within the Russian Empire. Contributors to the extreme Right publication Russkoe Znamia saw no reason to appeal to the Poles because of their "incessant hatred" of Russia.
22 Sobolevskii ascribed this appeal to the government's "nervousness [nervnichan΄e] ." 23 More respectable members of the Right also doubted the necessity of the policy of concessions. A.K. Varzhenevskii was afraid that Polish autonomy would weaken Russian infl uence in the empire. 24 "The government gives too many promissory notes, and it would be diffi cult to fulfi ll them," N. 26 These appeals confused right-wing sympathizers among high-ranking bureaucrats. The wife of Minister of Justice I.G. Shcheglovitov later recollected that her husband had called the document "the beginning of the end of Russia." 27 Opponents of social and political compromise suggested using the war as the pretext to confi ne the infl uence of representative institutions. Zemshchina's editor advised the government not to summon the State Duma or the State Council, and to make fi nancial decisions without them.
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At the same time, some on the Right interpreted the "Spirit of 1914" as an argument in favor of reforms and supported the policy of reconciliation with the opposition. The popular right-wing ideologist and conservative churchman I.I. Vostorgov admired the outburst of patriotism and supposed that the war might facilitate the necessary changes: "What a moment we are living through! The Unity of all people in Russia, future victories, inevitable to my mind, new conditions for church politics, a new [international] position of Russia and the Orthodox church in relation to the East and to the Slavic peoples, the disappearance of the necessity to make concessions and reforms under pressure from the bottom, and the possibility of carrying them out from the top, at the discretion of the government." He supposed that the war strengthened the Duma: "It is impossible to abolish the Duma, the war has cemented it." To his mind, the Right should not oppose social reforms: "We will not say a word against providing peasants with land and workers, and with legislation securing their rights." Besides, Vostorgov was ready to discuss giving equal rights to diff erent national and confessional groups, and widening the rights of the Duma. He suggested seeking political support from the lower classes: "It is high time to give up on the nobles and capitalists. Our path is not the same as theirs. Our ideal is the Church and the People [nash ideal-tserkovnonarodnyi ].
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According to Obleukhova, the Right needed to refi ne its policy and turn popular patriotism into a permanent factor in politics: "They [leaders on the Right] ought to transform themselves from a militant army into cultural workers, to support and strengthen this mighty spirit of nationalism through school reform and other means which could sustain the people at this high level of patriotism forever," she wrote to Purishkevich. 30 The addressee shared the author's enthusiasm and was ready for reconciliation with former enemies. Purishkevich asked to introduce her to the Kadet leader Miliukov, though in 1909 he stated that the latter's name had become the "synonym for spiritual 26 33 Right-wing intellectuals especially appreciated international and interconfessional cooperation. Columnist P.N. Ianov used the term "imperialism" in order to explicate the principle of cooperation. This term implied "peaceful cohabitation and mutual cooperation between the leading nationality and the dependent tribes, for the [purpose of achieving] common good and mutual benefi t." 34 In terms of international aff airs, particular attention was focused on the question of Poland. In autumn 1914, a group of conservative intellectuals headed by the scion of the famous Samarin family, F.D. Samarin, began discussions on the future of Poland. Its results were summed up in the memorandum, "On the 'Appeal' of the Supreme Commander to the Polish People." They argued that Polish autonomy could not lead to a long-lasting union between Russians and Poles, because the latter strove for independence. The future separation of Poland from the Russian Empire seemed to be the most reasonable way forward. 35 The majority of those on the right, however, preferred to solve political problems not by compromise but by an order from above. The supporters of this approach to national mobilization fi xed the roles of the state and society in terms of master and slave. One of the leaders of the right-wing Duma members, N.E. Markov, insisted that the Duma's duty was to help the government in its ventures. 36 Russkoe znamia wrote: "The government as an institution commissioned from above ought to play the leading role in common activities."
37
The newspaper reproached the ministers inclined towards a political dialogue for "fl irting with the public" [ The idea of pressing the government in order to make it follow a hard line was born from these fears. At the end of June 1915 the Odessa Union of Russian People [Odesskii Soiuz Russkikh Liudei ] suggested organizing an all-Russian convention of monarchists. Saratov rightists supported the idea, suggesting a preparatory "small convention" in their town. 43 Those who lobbied the government from the Right were pessimistic about the prospects for the new session of the representative institutions. The head of the right-wing group in the State Council, P.N. Durnovo, wrote: "From the very beginning of the campaign to expedite summoning the representative bodies, I thought this summoning not only useless, but politically harmful as well." 44 At the fi rst day of the session Durnovo delivered a speech, in which he argued that only strict order and its unconditional implementation might bring victory. 45 46 Nevertheless, the diarist doubted whether the Tsar and the ministers would follow Durnovo's advice. 47 The situation seemed very dangerous to him: "The weathercock has rushed to the left , and all the stakes are on the left . As far as I understand, the Tsar has not yet taken that path, but he does not see any support [from the Right]." 48 According to Maklakov, who aft er his dismissal from the government became one of the key fi gures among the rightists in the State Council, the monarch was surrounded by the people who "pretend to be . . . devoted to the Tsar, but [who] try to ruin his prerogative, and maybe the throne." 49 The foundation of the Progressive bloc stimulated these fears and consolidated many rightists around Durnovo's statement that order and discipline were the keys to victory. They tried to convince the government to take a hard line. P.N. Strukov, the Chairman of the Permanent Council of the United Nobility, warned the head of the government against surrendering to the opposition, because doing so would produce "instability of thought and inner confusion [shatahiia mysli i vnutrennei smuty]."
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The same message informed the resolutions of the Monarchist convention in Saratov, which took place August 27-29, 1915.
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In autumn 1915 the supporters of this line repeatedly blamed the government for tolerating the Progressive bloc, registering this discontent in their private correspondence. Zverev complained about the "manifestly favorable attitude of the reconstructed cabinet" to the bloc. 52 Markov stated: "The corruption of the statehood spreads not from below, but from the Ministers' offi ces. The infamous yellow (progressive) bloc of the State Duma and the State Council could have a chance to emerge only due to the eff orts and under a guidance of some Ministers,". 53 The supporters of the hard line supposed that the government had all resources to reinforce the order quickly. "It is enough . . . to strip certain persons from their court ranks, to show Messrs. Ministers their right places . . . , to take in hand Mayors, who dared to pass political resolutions, and everything will become in order," Maklakov wrote. 54 However, how to push the authorities to resolute actions remained an open question. Aleksandr I. Dubrovin, the head of the extreme right-wing Union of the Russian People, advised pressing for a harder political line, 46 
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Slavic Review S N L 880 avoiding publicity: "Meanwhile we decided to do our work without noise, quietly/secretly/-to contact like-minded persons, better privately, and to get ready for resistance to the unlawful onslaught."
55 Yet this kind of the "clandestine" activity did not satisfy many rightists. Rodzevich wrote to Dubrovin: "I agree with you that the times are terribly disturbing. Nevertheless, I disagree that we must be quiet; on the contrary, noise makes an impression on the authorities." 56 There were also confl icting views as to whether it would be better to unite all the rightists or to turn only to the extreme elements among them for support. Though the diff erence between the extremists like Dubrovin and more moderate Duma rightists embarrassed Rodzevich, he concluded that mingling with the latter might become helpful for the former.
57 "The more numerous we are, the stronger our voice is," seconded I.I. Dudnichenko. 58 The chairman of the Tula provincial Union of the Russian People, M.A. Orfenov, held the opposite view, suggesting that "a discussion of the latest events and aff airs in the Union should involve only unionists and monarchists of 'pure water' [authentic], and not 'margarine' [phony] ." 59 K.N. Paskhalov shared this position.
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The rightists did not manage to overcome these disagreements. In November 1915, two conventions (in Petrograd and Nizhnii Novgorod) took place instead of one, although their resolutions elaborated on the same themes. The progressive bloc's demand for a "ministry of confi dence" was interpreted as an attempt to break the Fundamental Laws and violate the Monarch's prerogative. Conciliation with the bloc was thereby deemed impossible, whereas the most complete state control over political, social, and economic activity of any kind was seen as highly desirable.
61
But there were also notable diff erences between the conventions. The Petrograd convention was dominated by the metropolitan rightists, connected with factions of the legislative chambers, while in Nizhnii Novgorod the provincial followers of Dubrovin (Dubrovinists) played a more important role. 62 This explains why the Nizhnii Novgorod convention adopted a more radical resolution, which insisted on the legal prosecution of the bloc's participants. 63 On the other hand, the Petrograd convention was more resolute in imposing its line on the government. One of the convention's participants wrote: "We are working out a political program for those in power." 64 The new leader of the rightist group in the State Council, A.A.Bobribskii, feared that this resolution had gone overboard, because "the Street [the mob], even a completely rightist one, ought not to give orders to the Sovereign or criticize his activities." 65 The extreme rightists did not plan to concentrate on persuading the public opinion, and placed their hope for the realization of their projects instead on the authorities. A letter to Duma right-wing faction member G.G. Zamyslovskii said: "Insignifi cant groups of rightists bearing the names of diff erent unions, will not bring much good. If that is necessary for people with the rightist views to occupy high positions in all offi ces; then we must secure it." 66 The rightist publicist N.A. Pavlov compared the voice of the public with "babble," muted by the "thunders of the world elements." He suggested consolidating power by limiting the number of decision-makers. "Now more than ever we need all the power of the authorities, but we are weakening it. We need to concentrate power in strong hands, to fi nd the strong, resolute will, whereas we are allowing the work and life itself to be fritted away in councils, committees and dumas . . . ."
67
The moderate rightists were also not satisfi ed with the situation in summer and autumn of 1915. "Everyone's nerves are so tired, so tired . . . and [there is] the helplessness of the people and complete decay of the authorities . . . ," Vostorgov wrote. 68 At the beginning of the session, the leadership of the Duma rightists became confused and supported V.A. Bobrinskii's resolution on the necessity to have "confi dence" in relations between the State and the population. 69 If Markov disavowed this step soon thereaft er, Vostorgov continued to demonstrate his disengagement and contemplated diff erent possible scenarios. "It seems to me that [forces of] the revolution are powerless now. But aft er the war it might be quite another story," he wrote in September 1915. "A strong movement is gathering momentum and a confl ict between the government and the intelligentsia's opposition is brewing. The victory will be won by the side that fi rmly believes in its truth, right and strength." To give yet another example, Purishkevich spoke against the confrontation with the Progressive bloc. He argued that instead of mutual accusations, the government and the majority of the legislative chambers ought to combine their eff orts in order to pacify the masses on the home front and to secure victory on the battlefi elds. He stressed that all the people were striving for victory, so fomenting an anti-revolutionary movement would undermine public unity and discredit only the Right. "Where is the Revolution now? Yes it exists, but in the minds of such politicians as Shcheglovitov, Dubrovin, Paskhalov, Toropov [a participant of the Petrograd Convention] and others. To summon this convention is not the mistake of the party, but the treason [committed by] the rightists, who alienated the masses by their untimely, groundless and blatant declarations." Purishkevich recommended gathering a convention of the rightists not during, but aft er the war, designing it "not as a convention to fi ght a non-existant revolution, but as a convention of the rightists united to revise and work out political programs to formulate a more adequate policy of conciliation with non-Russians [inorodtsy], based on evidence regarding inorodtsy that I saw during the war."
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Contributors to Kolokol, like previously, agitated for political compromise and looked toward the government as the main actor on the political stage. The editorials of the newspaper insisted that it was the government's duty to cooperate with society, which, in its turn, was believed to be interested in the closer contact with the state.
73 V. Ruadze, a Kolokol columnist, argued that members of the extreme right undermined the mutual trust between the Tsar and his people when they insisted on his strict control over society. 74 At the same time, Kolokol censured the Progressive bloc for its infl exibility. 75 Its pages declared compromise as the most rational way to solve political confl icts. 76 Columnist P.N. Ianov compared the Russian political landscape with a river valley. The "progressive unity" [progressivnoe edinenie] occupied one bank-the bureaucracy and conservatives [including the rightists]-the other. It is worth noting that the author located the monarchy ["Tsarev kurgan"] on the same bank as "progressive unity," and described it as "the hallmark of our genuine national-liberalism, understood as true freedom of thought, which has never encroached on our monarchic foundations." As a consequence, the Ianov declared that an exclusively right-wing political orientation was unreasonable: "Conservatism is the government's rampart. This is certainly true, but not always and not everywhere. One must know which pillars of the state are to be safeguarded, and how this is to be done. . . . Reaction contradicts genuine conservatism to the same extent as does the revolution and rootless radicalism." 78 The editorials qualifi ed appeals an uncompromising fi ght with the Progressive bloc as "dull and malicious advice to the highest authorities to keep society under tight control."
79 On the contrary, protests against Strukov's appeal to Goremykin were appreciated as expressions of the "revival of the nobility" 80 . The newspaper condemned the November conventions on the grounds that they hampered "the practical actions of the Tsar's Government" and encroached upon Monarch's prerogative. 81 Kolokol suggested an alternative political line, which it called "sound conservatism [zdorovyi konservatizm]," based on the "really practical union between the authorities and society on the grounds of mutual respect and collaboration for the glory of Russia."
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The consolidation of the conservative part of society in order to counterbalance its liberal segment was interpreted as a precondition for this union.
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Ruadze explained his vision of the conservatives' consolidation in a special memorandum titled "On the Militarization of the Right-Wing Movement in Russia." He stated that "the monarchist unions have turned out to become not the buttresses of cautious and thoughtful governmental policies, but rather the instruments of caustic critique, which has brought the fi nal disintegration to the rightist movement." He suggested uniting the rightist organizations into the single "Party of the Tsar and the People" [tsarsko-narodnaia partiia]. He proposed to organize its management on a military basis, making the government its ruling center. Ruadze opposed the plans of extreme rightists to use state institutions for their own interests, instead entertaining a contrasting idea of transforming the Right into the political instrument of the government. 
The Rightists and the "Siege of Power"
In spite of all it's activists' eff orts, pressure from the Right did not bring satisfactory results to its supporters, neither under Goremykin, nor under B.V. Stürmer, who became the head of the government in January 1916. The extreme rightists considered the government's disagreement with their line as the evidence of inadequacy within the ruling bureaucracy and the political system as a whole.
The former rightist member of the Duma, A.S. Viazigin, expressed his negative attitude about the ruling elite: "It is very diffi cult to say who is more inclined towards revolution, the lower classes of right-wing persuasion or the left ist intelligentsia [levye intelligentnye krugi]. Characteristically, discontent unites them, and many times I have heard from the mouths of rightists the proverb: 'Fish begin to stink from the head' [Ryba gniet s golovy]. In the eyes of the Russian people, those in power shamed themselves scandalously." 85 The chairman of the Nizhnii Novgorod convention, K.N. Paskhalov, resented not only the bureaucrats, but also the Tsar, who had not reacted properly, in Paskhalov's view, to the greetings of the assembly: "We are defending the sacred state ideal, which we consider the only salutory one for Russia, and instead of support, which we fully deserve, we receive nothing . . . " 86 D.A. Khomiakov called the Tsar "permanently evasive" and "weak-willed." 87 Sometimes the rightists accused the ruling elite of enmity towards them: "Of course, we will remain faithful to our idea of the state structure of Russia, but this idea will never be implemented; we are crushed by both our enemies and by those whose rights we defend." 88 The addressee, I.I. Dudnichenko, agreed: "Now monarchist organizations can count on themselves only, because we remain behind the closed doors of Russian statehood, and these doors were closed by precisely those people, who should have opened them wide." 89 For Dubrovin these were the signs of a catastrophe that had already begun: "In fact, all of us are Don Quixotes-we are playing at a standoff and serving as targets for both the left ists and the authorities . . . the disintegration is proceeding on a massive scale and it is hardly possible to prevent or remove its causes-one cannot be more royalist than the King." 90 "Everything dear to us is moving toward destruction, the foundations of the state are crumbling, every day confi rms the fact of the universal collapse," Paskhalov wrote 92 Sobolevskii refused to understand the reason for the visit at all. 93 For Nikol΄skii, it was a cumulative result of "Judeo-Masonic intrigue," [zhidovsko-masonskoi intrigi] Rasputin's infl uence, and even the underhanded plotting of the "martinists," who "have pulled on all the strings and are ruining a dying dynasty, controlling its rotten lusts, weaknesses, neurasthenic fi ts and passions." 94 The critics recognized that the eff ects of the pressure from the Right were rather modest. "We do not have instruments to scare the government . . . we do not have in our hands either public organizations or the resources of the Yids. And if we summon the convention, which would be worthless because of the insignifi cant number of participants and the absence of infl uential persons, this would compromise our cause," Paskhalov remarked. 95 Military successes in 1916 did not change this mood. "The situation in Russia is not simply disturbing, it is terrible, perhaps more terrible than it was in 1905. Since that time the government has weakened itself by endless concessions to the destructive infl uences that become even more powerful due to these very concessions," Paskhalov wrote. 96 According to Dudnichenko, the country was slipping toward revolution. 97 A policy of concessions could not, by defi nition, fi ght it successfully. "The policy of concessions is a fatal mistake. It will never do any good. It led to the shock of the year 1905 and will lead to the more dangerous perturbations now. One must fi ght their enemies, not make concessions to them, which would be perceived as weakness." 98 The idea of radical political reform, which was widely disseminated among members of the Right before the war, did not disappear from rightist discourse during the war. As early as August 1914, S.A.Volodimerov expressed hope that the war experience would motivate a revision of the theoretical foundation for the peoples' participation in the legislative process. The idea of a right ought to be replaced by the idea of an obligation. Likewise, he argued that "the parliamentarian game of the political arithmetic with legislative votes" ought to 91 In August 1915 the editor of the rightist newspaper Volga and the Chairman of the Saratov convention, N.N. Tikhmenev, appealing to the monarchists, pointed to the importance of changing the Fundamental Laws, which he argued only bound the government. 100 The November conventions set the priorities in another way, however: the rightists represented themselves as the defenders of the Fundamental Laws, whereas the supporters of the "ministry of confi dence" were represented as infringers on the legal order. Apparently, at this moment they still cherished hopes that if the government would follow the hard line, the situation might be improved without institutional changes.
During the fi rst half of 1916 the idea of reforming political institutions became popular among the rightists again. They explained the necessity and urgency of the reform with the destruction of the country's administrative mechanism. Tikhmenev wrote about the "unimaginable chaos" that would be produced by the rivalry between diff erent centers of power, the Council of Ministers being the weakest among them. the fi rst, and the third to the second," Bulatovich wrote. 105 So, in his opinion, the subordination of various branches of authorities was preferable to their division. The author insisted also on the eff ective governmental control over the non-governmental organizations. 106 All the projects, described above, appeared before the November session of the State Duma and the State Council, which opened the fi nal phase of the confrontation between the representative institutions and the government. Their implementation would mean a "revolution from the Right," or the "preventive counterrevolution."
The status quo did not satisfy the more moderate rightists either: " . . . We need the reforms and reorganization in many fi elds of administration . . ." Purishkevich declared in the Duma in . While the extreme rightists aimed at strengthening of the Tsar's hold over the Government, he emphasized the necessity of its independence and rational organization of work. The speaker advocated the non-governmental organizations, and stated that "without the help of the public forces and non-governmental sanitary organizations Russia could not fi ght, as it is fi ghting now . . . " He stated that the war changed his views in the nationality question: it transformed him from the "hater" of the Poles into their "biggest friend." His attitude to the Jews changed too. He did not deny his hostility to them, but refused to see them responsible for all Russian failures. Well-known as one of the most uncompromising politicians before the war, during the war period he insisted on the necessity of the common language and political dialogue. " . . . We must fi nd a decent language for the debate, and I am sure, we will fi nd it, because, as I believe, we are used to respect each other, being united by the patriotic impulse . . . ."
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Puriskevich developed these ideas in his brochure "What Wilhelm II Wants from Russia and England in the Great Battle of Nations." To his mind, the war generated an unprecedented public unity, which was menaced not by the opposition, but by the offi cialdom, scared by the patriotic activities of the masses. 108 It was evident to him "that aft er the war the Russian progressive thought would win over the conservative one, so that the liberal trend would dominate." 109 Purishkevich's evolution embarrassed his former collaborators. "Where does Purishkevich go?! Did he really decide to part with us?!," Dudnichenko asked in February 1916. 110 Eight months later, even before the beginning of the last Duma session he gave a positive answer to the latter question.
During 1916 the hot discussion on the Strukov's appeal to Goremykin rocked the United Nobility. Some provincial noble associations did not only censure him, but left the organization. According to the manager [upravliauishchii delami] of the Permanent Committee of the United Nobility S.A. Panchulidzev, by the beginning of February 1916, four provincial corporations had left , while 22 publicly disapproved of Strukov's appeal. 112 The convention of the provincial marshals of nobility on May 12, 1916 came to the conclusion that Strukov substituted his own opinion for the opinion of all the nobility. The second convention of the marshals of the nobility, held in August, 1916, spoke out in favor of limiting the Permanent council's power and re-electing it.
113 Thus, a considerable part of the United Nobility, which traditionally supported right-wing hard-liners, preferred to break with them.
Among the rightist mass-media, Kolokol remained the most consistent follower of the fl exible line. Summing up the results of Goremykin's premiership, the newspaper reproached him for authoritarianism and ignoring the opinion of his colleagues and the public. 115 Analyzing Stürmer's and the bloc's declarations, the editor of the newspaper did not see any insurmountable contradictions between them. 116 Kolokol identifi ed itself as the representative of "state conservatism"-an ideology of the "third path" that resisted both revolution and reaction. Defending "reasonable freedom" and "popular initiative," it condemned "state-paid hurrah-patriotism and slavelike attitudes." Petr Stolypin was declared the model representative of this type of conservatism because he had been "an adherent and bearer of the principles of national evolution and gradual progress." Liberal and conservative ideas were to supplement each other "in harmonious combination." 117 The authority of the state ought to be combined with wide public initiative.
118 In contradistinction to the extreme rightists, Kolokol appreciated the contribution of the Duma to the war eff ort and to securing communication between the state and population. Kolokol considered the consolidation of purely conservative elements to be the most important preliminary condition for this highly desirable liberalconservative consensus: "The establishment of the Progressive bloc looks quite natural, but our liberals, to be honest, must recognize the civil rights of the representatives of the other stream." 120 The rightists, in their turn, had to get rid of their contempt for the law and refrain from the abuse of power.
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The war demonstrated the necessity of changing the programs of the rightist political unions, established during the Revolution of 1905 in order to spread their infl uence over all groups of the population. The main political aim of the Right would be to "maintain the unity of all Russian citizens, who remain faithful to their duty towards the Tsar and the motherland." An important element of this strategy would be the conciliation between various national groups. Kolokol's author proposed "to engage not only native Russians, but also inorodtsy into creative activity on the all-Russian scale, if these nonRussians, by the virtue of their spirit, gained the honorable right to work for the good of the motherland in the ranks of the Russian patriots-monarchists." 123 Three weeks later he continued, "No reliable hopes for the future remain. Only God's miracle might save us, but one has to deserve the miracle at least by humbleness and by being aware of a sin. And we have neither of the two." 124 Obleukhova experienced anxiety, too.: "Dissatisfaction and indignation unite everyone and everything. The smallest spark is enough to start a mass pogrom." 125 These anxieties constituted the emotional background for Purishkevich's withdrawal from the right-wing faction, which fi nally led to its breakup. At the meeting of the faction on November 18, Purishkevich exposed the main ideas of the speech that he was going to deliver the next day, but did 126 Three days later N.E. Markov attempted to repudiate Purishkevich's accusations, but this only led to a scandalous exchange between Markov and the Chairman of the Chamber, M.V. Rodzianko. As a result, Markov was excluded from the Duma's work for 15 sittings, while the predominant majority of the members of the right-wing faction left it and organized a new grouping named the "Faction of Independent Rightists." 127 The XII Congress of the United Nobility became one more expression of the tendency towards the consolidation of the moderate rightists and their political rapprochement with the opposition. On December 1, 1916 the congress adopted a resolution, which stated that the "monarchic principle, which has served as the basis of the state for centuries, is wavering in its own foundations." The resolution further averred that "irresponsible dark forces" obtained infl uence over the "highest authorities" The changes in the leadership of the organization were quite adequate to the resolution. The chairmanship was given to A.D. Samarin, who, having been excluded from the government in autumn 1915, had a reputation of advocating dialogue with the Progressive bloc. These political changes, as well as the new leadership of the Right in the Council of Ministers, were cooly received by the Tsar.
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By the end of 1916 and the beginning of 1917, the majority of the Duma rightists and the United Nobility were moving to the left , towards the Progressive bloc, whereas Kolokol was drift ing in the opposite direction. It began to associate instability not with the actions (or lack thereof) of the government, but with the activity of the Progressive bloc. An editorial from November 15, 1916 noted that "everything in the bloc is temporary, accidental, unsystematic, unaccountable, and inconsistent, devoid of a program."
130 So the only way out was "to rely on the government only, and to support it with all our powers." The government, in its turn, had to move towards society and to follow the policy of "enlightened conservatism," associated with the bureaucrats, with a reputation of proponents of political dialogue-A.V. Krivoshein, A.N. Naumov, S.D. Sazonov, and P.N. Ignat΄ev.
132 Still, the Tsar should remain in the center of the public consolidation: "Russia needs the union of all the parties, of all the estates under the Sovereign Scepter of the Monarch, the single radiant source of truth and mercy." 133 The extreme rightists interpreted what was happening in the legislative chambers, whose session began on November 1, as a direct attack on the Monarchy. They saw the manifestation of the revolutionary wave in the critique of the government, raised by the Progressive bloc in order to seize power. But in spite of all that, the high-ranking bureaucrats still did not want to support the Right. N.A. Zverev wrote: "We are living through hard times. Steel nerves are needed to stand the strikes both from the Right and the Left . And I do not know which of them are more painful; for me personally the strikes from our former colleagues, fi rst and most of all, from B.V. Stürmer, are especially painful." 134 The government's actions lacked fi rmness, according to its critics from the Right: "The intrigues of the Messrs., covering themselves with society as a shield [shchitom obshchestvennosti] did not meet any resistance; on the contrary, the government creeps in front of them," K.N. Paskhalov wrote to Maklakov and off ered him to head the struggle against this "common fatal trend." 135 Dubrovin recommended dissolving the Duma until the end of the war. 136 On November 26, 1916 N.A. Maklakov delivered a major speech in the State Council. He attached special importance to strict government control over non-governmental organizations, because they were busy with fi ghting not the enemy, but the authorities: "It [the home front] does everything for the war, but this is a war against order. It does everything for victory, but this is victory over authority." The government could not cope with this challenge, so "the triumphantly hypertrophic development of society is transformed into its dictatorship, and the atrophy of authority is transformed into its agony." Maklakov demanded a stop to the disintegration of the administrative system: " As time passed, the extreme rightists began stressing the necessity not only of restoring order, which turned to be insuffi ciently vital, but to build a new one. In December, D.I. Bulatovich worked out a new political project based on the conception of corporatism. He placed entrepreneurs and workers together with landowners and peasants in the "productive class" (the fi rst element of each pair was identifi ed as the "accumulated labor"-capital; the second one-as the "available labor"). The "productive class" was opposed to the parasitical "mediatory class." Bulatovich characterized the State Council and the State Duma as "artifi cially-constructed strongholds where the ideas of the mediatory class reside, being the most harmful to the state." Therefore, these institutions deserved abolition. State control was to become the main instrument of the struggle with the "mediatory class." Bulatovich recommended simplifying the laws, and strengthening the state's infl uence in the court, self-government, press, and education. The state ought to maintain the clergy and make it take part in productive labor. The obligation to work productively would to be imposed on other groups of the population.
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In January 1917 Bulatovich returned to the problem of control over the bureaucracy and suggested to form the special "Governmental Corps," whose members could participate in the government's proceedings. This institute should strengthen the supervision over high-ranking bureaucrats and prevent the "most harmful veering off course to one side or another." 139 He stated that basic Christian principles of the state management were the ideals of oneman command [edinonachalie] and all-embracing control from above: "The ideal form of government based on Christian Statehood is the same that has until now been recognized by everyone as ideal for any army: a single person is placed at the head of the state, as at the head of a Christian army, holding in his hands all the threads of management-all the commands." 140 Tsytovich, the author of the previously mentioned August 1916 article "Minister" in Russkoe znamia, published in January 1917 the brochure "Supreme State Guardianship" [Vyshee Gosudarstvennoe Popechitel΄stvo]. To his mind, all that happened aft er the publication of his article in August 1916 confi rmed his conclusions: neither the Duma, the State Council, nor the government could solve the current problems or even envision strategic perspectives. Only the "Supreme State Guardianship," subordinated directly to the Tsar and aimed at securing the control of supreme authority over the bureaucracy, could achieve these goals.
141 N.N. Tikhanovich-Savitskii continued to insist on the revision of the Fundamental Laws. In January 1917 he wrote to G.G Zamyslovskii, inducing him to prepare three variants of the revision: "1) with deep changes, 2) with medium changes, 3) with insignifi cant, easily acceptable changes." In addition, he recommended "to leave a loophole in Tikhanovich-Savitskii appealed to Tsarina Alexandra Feodorovna with a suggestion "not to postpone changing the traitorously composed Fundamental Laws," however the position of the Emperor and his wife on this issue raised his doubts. Tikhanovich-Savitskii thus recommended to "surround the Sovereign in Tsarskoe Selo and in the headquarters with the rightists only . . . and to be closer to the Tsarina to prevent her from leaving us." 143 The author was aware that breaking the status quo by the Right might provoke bloodshed, so he asked N.A. Maklakov if he was ready to suppress potential resistance to political changes, in case Maklakov would return to the post of Interior Minister, and requested to him name the most reliable generals. 144 Other representatives of the extreme Right raised the question of the political reconstruction too. By the end of 1916 and the beginning of 1917, the circle headed by the infl uential conservative politician A.A. RimskiiKorsakov, worked out several projects for institutional change, one of which was presented to Nicholas II by N.D. Golitsyn. 145 Its author, member of the State Council right-wing group M.Ia. Govorukha-Otrok, suggested dissolving the State Duma and declaring the revision of the Fundamental Laws. According to him Russian constitutional reform, begun in 1905, had utterly failed. The author picked two main drawbacks of political structures designed by the Fundamental Laws of 1906: the incorrect division of power between the Monarchy and the representative institutions, and the "absolute inadequacy of the Duma electoral law."
To overcome the fi rst drawback, Govorukha-Otrok planned to transform the legislative body into a consultative one. He planned to solve the second problem by reforming the electoral legislation on an estate basis. In addition, he wanted the number of elected candidates to exceed the number of seats, because this would allow the fi nal choice to be made on the basis of "drawing lots, or, the best by the Emperor's grace." He recommended the government form a special structure capable of securing the pro-government majority in the Duma. Also, Govorukha-Otrok recommended changes in the membership and competence of the State Council. The members of the Progressive block were to be dismissed. Bills were to be sent to the Tsar together with the opinions of the majority and the minority, giving him the possibility to make any fi nal decision wished. In historical perspective, the victory over the 1905 Revolution symbolized by the dissolution of the Second State Duma and the promulgation of the June 3, 1907 electoral law turned out to be a pyrrhic one. The power of the Sovereign remained seriously limited, the government had to reckon with the representatives of the population, and the liberal opposition preserved substantial political infl uence. The counterrevolutionary forces split, and on the eve of World War I, the rightists parted into three organizations: the Union of Russian People, the Union of Archangel Michael, and the All-Russian Dubrovinist Union of the Russian People. Confl icts between them were caused not only by clashes of leaders' personal ambitions, but also by diff erent opinions over principle political questions. The war gave additional stimulus for the fragmentation of the Right. For some of its members, the "Spirit of 1914" became the serious argument in favor of the democratic institutions and procedures. These rightists called for the adaptation of conservative forces to the post-1905 Revolution political structure. Their opponents were afraid that the wave of patriotism would soon wane. They believed that strict governmental control over non-governmental institutions is a more reliable means of maintaining social stability than the dialogue between the state and society. Later on, this position became the basis on which the Right's plans to undermine the status quo were laid, and on which the ideas of removing democratic institutions and practices from Russian politics were based. The war widened the political range of the Russian Right in opposite directions, including the conservativeliberal consensus on the one hand and the radical Right on the other. All this aggravated the confl ict within the Right and led to its polarization.
The motivation to reconstruct the established political order turned out to be much stronger than the desire to preserve it. The rightists, regardless of the nuances of their ideological stances, took the war as an opportunity for political reconstruction; again, the drive for the change was stronger than the drive for preservation. The threat to the Monarchy and the Monarch ilicited from the Russian Right not so much a desire to defend the old order as to come to terms with the fact that it was not worth defending. This largely explains the passivity of the Right during the February-March 1917 days. It is worth noting that for many of them, the desire to not become involved in political events began long before chists, now startled, call me to lead them. I, of course, will not abide." 149 It is worth noting that these sentiments were set down by the pens of normally incredibly active and eff ective personalities, representing competing segments of the Russian Right. Having come into being as an instrument for the defense of traditional autocracy, the Right refused to defend it in its post-revolutionary reincarnation as a dualistic monarchy.
